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Special Operations Air Mobility Vehicle (SOAMV) is the military term used to describe 
the Weight Shift Control (WSC) aircraft. The WSC aircraft is a type of Light-Sport 
aircraft that has certain characteristics that distinguish it from the more vague aircraft 
industry segment of light-sport aircraft.  The WSC aircraft consists of three major but 
simple parts: the wing, the carriage, and the pilot. Everything about this aircraft is based 
on simple, portable, and inexpensive concepts with very little use of modern technology. 
This keeps the costs down and maximizes the basics of aviation to include calling on the 
skills and training of the pilot.  
Several manufacturers produce this commercial aircraft. They are Air Creation 
USA, Airborne, Evolution, Concept Aviation, Manta Aircraft S.A., and Northwing 
Design. This project has three objectives: (1) describe the WSC aircraft and its 
capabilities. Assess its benefits and costs relative to the V-22 Osprey, the newest troop 
transport helicopter, and the U.S. Air Force (USAF) Predator, an Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicle Drone; (2) perform an industry analysis of the WSC training and aircraft sales 
industry; and (3) determine the expected government training capabilities and costs.  
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 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Special Operations Air Mobility Vehicle (SOAMV) is the military term used to describe 
the weight shift control (WSC) aircraft. The WSC aircraft is a type of light-sport aircraft 
that has certain characteristics that distinguish it from the more vague aircraft industry 
segment of light-sport aircraft. The WSC aircraft consists of three major but simple parts: 
the wing, the carriage, and the pilot. Everything about this aircraft is based on simple, 
portable, and inexpensive concepts with very little use of modern technology. This keeps 
the costs down and maximizes the basics of aviation to include calling on the skills and 
training of the pilot. Several manufacturers produce this commercial aircraft. They are 
Air Creation USA, Airborne, Evolution, Concept Aviation, Manta Aircraft S.A. and 
Northwing Design. This project has three objectives: (1) describe the WSC aircraft and 
its capabilities, and assess its benefits and costs relative to both the V-22 Osprey, the 
newest troop transport helicopter, and the U.S. Air Force (USAF) Predator, an Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicle Drone; (2) perform an industry analysis of the WSC training and aircraft 
sales industry; and (3) determine the expected government training capabilities and costs.  
The U.S. military faces numerous threats and mission requirements in today’s 
world of irregular warfare (IW). Each one calls on a different weapon system or platform 
to provide mission success. This project determined there is a need for the Osprey and 
Predator to carry out certain missions; and also determined that there is a capability gap 
with opposed access (OA) that requires the SOAMV. In the process of analyzing the 
training industry, the project brought to light that small, one or two person-training 
centers are the standard across the U.S. Additionally, a regionalized customer base and 
overall low demand creates a relatively non-competitive industry. Another major factor 
affecting the industry, is the Federal Aviation Administration’s recent inclusion of the 
WSC aircraft into the light-sport aircraft category. This inclusion has added costs and 
time to training and has reduced demand dramatically. For the aircraft sales industry, 
similar dynamics were found.  
Finally, this project looked at current military aviation training and the future 
training structure of the SOAMV, its ideal training location, and associated costs. The 
 xv 
 project specifically looked at the Navy’s SH60 helicopter training program, which 
showed a mix of military and civilian trainers involved in the different phases, with 
civilians instructing student pilots in the first year and military pilots instructing in the 
second year. This arrangement works well for a training program like the SH60, because 
of the time it takes to master basic flight skills and then move on to advanced weapon 
systems training.  
In the case of the SOAMV, the required training is only three weeks. The much 
shorter training program is due to the simple nature of the WSC aircraft, and the fact that 
it does not have military weapon systems. Considering those two aspects of the aircraft, 
the need for military instructors is greatly diminished. The author contends that three 
civilian and three military instructors on staff is the right mix for this program.  Both 
civilian and military instructors have unique skill sets that students would benefit from.  
The numbers of each could fluctuate by one, but at all times there should be at least two 
of each. Additionally, Yuma Proving Ground was selected as the best location based on 
optimal training conditions, installation support services, and value to taxpayers. The first 
year costs for a schoolhouse in Yuma were estimated to be $2,638,132.00, with ongoing 
annual costs estimated at $1,535,132.00. The author generated these cost estimates using 
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 I. INTRODUCTION 
On 6 August 2011, the highest number of U.S. Special Forces personnel killed in 
a single incident in the history of the Special Operations Command occurred in 
Afghanistan. A Chinook CH-47, carrying 33 passengers, along with five crewmen, was 
shot down by Taliban insurgents. Of the 33 passengers, 25 were American Special Forces 
personnel. This is not an isolated incident; there have been several smaller crashes since 
2001 in Afghanistan and Iraq that have claimed the lives of elite warriors. When a soldier 
of this caliber has been lost, the military not only loses a service member, but also an 
asset it has invested millions of dollars in. Because of their extensive training, Special 
Forces personnel require millions in military resources. The risks associated with 
transporting highly trained Special Forces personnel into high-threat environments using 
helicopters will be further examined in the following pages. In addition to looking at 
monetary costs associated with losing military personnel, this chapter will assess costs of 
air assets currently in use by the U.S. military.  
In his 2009 JFQ essay, “Striking the Right Balance,” Secretary of Defense Robert 
Gates argued that the nation’s ballooning defense budget would force us to strike a 
balance between meeting our national security challenges and living within our means. 
He stated, “We cannot expect to eliminate risk through higher defense budgets—in effect 
to ‘do everything, buy everything.’ Resources are scarce, yet we still must set priorities 
and consider inescapable tradeoffs and opportunity costs.” Spending lavishly on 
expensive weapon systems that cannot meet government test standards, or, in many 
cases, provide more than what is required, needs to be addressed and corrected. 
Additionally, he emphasized that the increase in funding for special forces needs to 
continue. He recognized the cost effectiveness of using a small number of forces to do 
critical tasks using proven and mature technology will save a tremendous amount of 
money (Gates, 2009, p. 1). 
The next section of this chapter will provide background on the Predator and its 
positives and negatives in the U.S. military. The same discussion for the V-22 Osprey 
will follow this section. In the final section of this chapter, the new option—the Special 
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 Operations Air Mobility Vehicle (SOAMV)—will be introduced. What missions the 
SOAMV can perform, and why, will be discussed in this section.  
A. DRONES: HOW THEY CONTRIBUTE TO THE FIGHT  
A single U.S. Air Force (USAF) owned drone (Figure 1), from the Predator series 
just recently passed 20,000 flight hours. This is a remarkable feat considering the short 
history of this weapon system. USAF operators applaud the reliability and performance 
of this intensely used aircraft. Predator 107 (P107) achieved the groundbreaking mark on 
May 5, 2013 while taking part in a 21-hour combat mission in support of Operation 
Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan (Maguire 2013). Reliability and performance are the 
key attributes of this technological marvel that the U.S. government has been 
experimenting with since the early 1980s. Both the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
and the Department of Defense (DoD) saw the positives of this quiet, lightweight, and 
discreet aircraft. The first official development contract was awarded to the General 
Atomics Aeronautical Systems Company in January 1994. The Advanced Concept 
Technology Demonstration (ACTD) phase lasted from 1994 to 1996, with the 
government purchasing 12 aircraft and 3 ground control stations (Pike, 2002).   
 
Figure 1.  Predator Drone (from Mortimer, 2011) 
During exercises in the U.S. in 1995, successful use of the ACTD aircraft led to 
the deployment of the aircraft to the Balkans that same year. During this time period, the 
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 Predator program fell under the Navy’s Joint Program Office for Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicles (JPO-UAV), with operations conducted by a joint Army/Navy team. The 
transition from an Army/Navy led program to an USAF-led program took place in the 
late 1990s (Pike, 2002). 
The USAF acquired 60 Predators by 2001, losing 20 during operations. Icy 
conditions were to blame for almost all of the lost aircraft. De-icing systems were then 
installed along with an upgraded turbocharged engine and improved avionics. These 
improvements greatly enhanced the durability and survivability of the aircraft.  The 
USAF designated the MQ-1 variant in 2002. The “M” stands for multi-role to signify the 
different functions the aircraft has taken on. (Pike, 2002) 
Moving beyond reconnaissance and into precision strike capabilities, the MQ-1 
has become a special weapon to conduct irregular warfare operations. The author’s 
argument for a new option—the SOAMV—is related to the munitions aspect of this 
aircraft. Performing kinetic missions with an unmanned weapon system creates a host of 
challenges with diplomacy and winning the hearts and minds of civilian populations in 
the Middle East and across the globe.  
To avoid the issues caused by the munitions aspect of drones, using the Predator 
and other drones solely for reconnaissance missions and other non-lethal military 
operations appears to make sense. The United States still gets remarkable value out of the 
$20 million drones, even without using them to kill high value targets (Booth, 2013). The 
level of intelligence gathering and battlefield monitoring that the aircraft can do with 
such a small cost to the DoD is astounding. Military personnel are able to operate them 
from trailers on stateside military installations. In 2012, according to Under Secretary of 
Defense, Robert Hale, it cost $850,000 to feed, house, and secure one military service 
member operating in Afghanistan for one year (Shaughnessy, 2012). By having military 
personnel perform their missions from home bases the government is eliminating that 
expense. This would not just be the controller of the aircraft, but it would also include the 
other personnel that would have to be doing the intelligence gathering in the war zone. 
This could be the Army soldier on the ground or the P3 aircrew that is gathering 
intelligence from the sky.  
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  Drones are not a 100 percent solution to IW. In addition to the heavy financial 
costs that drones incur, the DoD must also consider the negative consequences of 
launching strikes from thousands of feet in the air. The U.S. has greatly reduced the 
chances of soldiers getting killed when drones are used to kill high-value targets, but that 
comes at what cost to the overall goal in the war against terrorism? The DoD has moved 
toward a “star wars” approach to engaging the enemy in Iraq and Afghanistan, but what 
has been lost in this movement is the recognition that there will always be a human 
element to war. The backlash from Afghani and Iraqi civilians losing innocent family and 
friends to drone attacks should drive the discussion of finding alternatives to such action.  
B. THE OSPREY  
The V-22 Osprey (Figure 2), with its diminishing capabilities but escalating costs, 
is a prime example of what Gates would like to avoid in the future in the acquisition 
world. The Osprey has two different models, the MV-22 and the CV-22. The MV-22 is 
used by the Marine Corps for logistics and troop movement, and the CV-22 is owned by 
the Air Force to support special operations. Both variants are similar, with both having 
tilt-rotor design that operates as a helicopter for takeoff and landings, and converts to a 
turboprop once inflight. The Osprey’s (both MV-22 and CV-22 variants) features would 
allow it to operate on amphibious ships, aircraft carriers, and in combat zones carrying 




Figure 2.  Photo of Osprey (from Military-today.com, 2013) 
Having begun in 1981 by the Army, the Osprey program faced its first challenge, 
one that will stay with it for the entire life of the program. This challenge is the cost of 
making an aircraft that operates as a helicopter for takeoffs and landings and converts to a 
turboprop aircraft once airborne and supporting those unique parts that make that 
possible. In 1982, the Army quickly backed out of the program because of cost concerns, 
transferring it to the Navy. Nearly a decade later, the Osprey was airborne for the first 
time; however, shortly after that first flight, the Secretary of Defense stopped requesting 
funds for the program, citing that the program was not affordable. Production stopped, 
but not for long. Congress did not agree with the DoD and continued to fund the project. 
Within a few years, Bell Helicopter Textron and Boeing embarked on a joint venture to 
begin producing production-representative aircraft to the Navy (Sullivan, 2009, ).  
Starting in 1997, Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP) kicked off. Tests results for 
operational effectiveness and operational suitability were mixed in 2000. Navy testers 
concluded the Osprey passed both operational effectiveness and suitability tests, whereas 
the DoD’s independent testers only had it passing the operational effectiveness tests. In 
December 2000, a Program Decision Meeting was scheduled. It never happened. Two 
fatal crashes occurred just before the scheduled meeting, grounding the aircraft and 
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 sending the program back to do more research and development, while continuing low-
rate production.  
More research and development led to aircraft modifications that fixed the safety 
concerns. In 2005, both Navy and DoD testers announced that the new, modified aircraft, 
passed both operational effectiveness and suitability tests. Full-Rate Production was 
approved by the Defense Acquisition Board in September of 2005 (Sullivan, 2009). 
Successfully operating in 2007 and 2008 in Iraq, and in other austere deployed 
environments, the Osprey earned recognition by the Marine Corps for its extended range, 
speed, and payload in comparisons to the helicopters it is supposed to replace (Bolkcom, 
2009). In 2009, the Osprey achieved Initial Operational Capability, but was still hounded 
by the lack of engine longevity. The Rolls-Royce engines were supposed to last “so many 
thousand hours” but were only lasting about 420 flight hours. Although the Osprey has 
come a long way, quality and safety challenges seem to linger (Bolkcom, 2009). 
Due to  design flaws, poor components, and support failures program costs  
continued to climb.  In 2009, the GAO reported that the program, for its entire life cycle, 
is expected to cost $79 billion. This is while the total number of aircraft being procured 
has fallen from 1,000 to 500, resulting in a 148 percent increase in cost for each one. 
Included in this estimate are the operations and support costs that are expected to double 
over the life of the program (Sullivan, 2009, ).  
The Marine Corps has carried the Osprey forward as a critical piece of their 
mission in conducting traditional warfare despite its many failures and continues defects, 
not to mention its ballooning price tag. Skeptically accepting the Osprey as a necessary 
weapon system for the U.S. military, this author feels it only fulfills a handful of the total 
missions the U.S. military will face in the future.  
C. WEIGHT SHIFT CONTROL AIRCRAFT: A NEW OPTION  
Considering the irregular warfare (IW) threat facing the United States and what 
the Osprey and Predator have brought to the fight, this author sees the potential for a new 
military aircraft. This new aircraft is the Weight Shift Control (WSC) aircraft, with its 
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 military name being the Special Operations Air Mobility Vehicle (SOAMV). Opposed 
Access missions that require non-detection (both entering and exiting) are future missions 
that cannot be ignored and their success would greatly benefit from the use of the 
SOAMV.  
Opposed access (OA) scenarios and environments are defined by Denial and 
Anti-Access strategies of the enemy. An example of this would be a high-ranking 
member of Al-Qaida living among his bodyguards and innocent civilians in a village in 
Pakistan. The high value target is surrounding himself with his militia, but is also using 
civilians as a shield from massive force (troops being delivered by Osprey) or a drone 
attack (Predator). In addition to these factors complicating the execution of the mission, 
which is to kill the high value target without killing civilians, the realization of radar 
technologies and mobile anti-aircraft weaponry (rocket-propelled grenades) is also of 
concern for the Osprey option. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) Commanders 
see this as an Area of Vulnerability in present and future conflicts (Kenny, 2012, p. 7). 
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter II describes the 
aircraft, while Chapter III discusses the industrial organization of the aircraft sales 
market. Chapter IV presents the industrial organization of aircraft training, followed by 
Chapter V, which describes current military training for the SH 60 Helicopter. Chapter 
VI describes the ideal mix of civilian and military training; while Chapter VII describes 
the suggested government site and expected costs.  Chapter VIII concludes with the main 
findings of the document.  
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 II. THE WSC AIRCRAFT DEFINED 
The WSC aircraft is a type of Light-Sport aircraft with certain characteristics that 
distinguish it from the more vague aircraft industry segment of Light-sport aircraft. The 
WSC aircraft consists of three major, but simple parts: the wing, the carriage, and the 
pilot. As seen in Figure 3, everything about this aircraft is based on simple, portable, and 
inexpensive concepts with very little use of modern technology. This keeps down costs 
and maximizes the skills and training of the pilot. Specifications and capabilities of the 
aircraft draw mostly from the wing characteristics and engine size. 
 
Figure 3.  WSC Aircraft (from Start-Flying.com, 2013) 
A. THE WING 
The wing size changes the dynamic of the aircraft immensely and creates a 
tradeoff management process for the pilot. A WSC aircraft may be fitted with single 
(fabric only on top) or dual surfaced (fabric on top and bottom) wing. Dual surface wings 
perform better, but are less convenient when it comes to access to wing battens. Changing 
the wing size changes how fast and how smooth the aircraft flies and will also affect the 
 9 
 payload. For example, an 11-meter wing will travel much faster and smoother, but carry 
far less payload than a 15-meter wing. The pilot only needs a few minutes and an Allen 
wrench to switch out or assemble the wings. Depending on the mission, you may need 
more payload capacity, or more emphasis will be placed on a smaller signature where 
non-detection is the priority (Kenny, 2012, ). 
The collapsible nature of the wings is the central element of one its most desirable 
features—portability. Transporting this aircraft to conflict zones across the globe is made 
easy by the fact the entire aircraft can be folded into a 5- by 10-meter crate. This 
portability can also be integrated into actual missions. One possible mission is for special 
forces personnel to parachute into a high risk area along with a crated WSC aircraft. Once 
the mission is complete the operator assembles the aircraft and flies out. This mission is 
similar to the way in which Small Boat Teams under Naval Special Warfare conduct 
maritime operations that require aerial delivery of boats and personnel from C-130 
aircraft. This portability allows for flexibility in mission planning, and gives commanders 
the ability to use their operators in different ways.  
B. THE ENGINE 
The most popular engine in the WSC aircraft is the Rotax 912UL. The 80-hp 
engine is one of six variants of the 912 series. Development in the series has produced 
critical improvements in time between overhaul (TBO) and electric start options. TBO is 
a metric for readiness in all military aircraft, and an element that is scrutinized heavily. 
The electric start option allows the engine to be turned on and off while in flight. This is 
critical to missions that require zero detection caused by the noise of the aircraft. 
Additionally, high power-to-weight ratio, low fuel costs, and comparatively quiet 
operation make it an ideal fit for SOAMV. A mandatory engine overhaul must occur at 
the 2,000-hour mark of operations, which costs approximately $10,000. This cost is 
factored in to the $44 per-hour operating costs, which also includes all fuel, lubricants, 
filters, tires, and wing maintenance. With the Predator drones using the Rotax motors as 
well, possible synergies are available for procurement and maintenance.  
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 C. SAFETY FEATURES  
With the inexpensive nature of the Rotax aircraft, along with its size and weight, 
safety is a common concern. To minimize that concern, the aircraft has been outfitted 
with several features that aid in its safe use, and the survivability of the craft. Drawing on 
the basic design, the aircraft is essentially a powered glider. In the event of an engine 
failure, this allows the aircraft to operate and land safely without power. The FAA WSC 
Flying handbook illustrates how an aircraft with a 5:1 glide ratio, at an altitude of 5,280 
feet, gives the pilot 78 square miles to land safely.  
The second safety feature is that the carriage electrical system operates 
independently of the engine. This feature allows for an electronics failure with the 
avionics and communication equipment, without affecting engine performance. The final 
safety feature, and arguably the most comforting, is the Ballistic Recovery System 
(BRS). The BRS is an emergency parachute deployment system. In case of severe wing 
failure, or some other event that would cause loss of control, the BRS can bring the 
aircraft, and its crew, to a safe landing. It has been successfully deployed as low as 50 
feet and as high as 6,000 feet (BRS Aerospace, 2013).  
Now that we have discussed the reason for the aircraft and its characteristics in 
detail, Chapter III will discuss the training industry found in the United States.  
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 III. TRAINING INDUSTRY ANALYSIS  
This chapter will look at the training industry using Porter’s five forces of 
competitive strategy.1 Porter (1979) contends five forces determine competitive 
characteristics and the extent of how competitive an industry is going to be. This model 
will aid in analyzing the industry to see whether  it is capable of training Special Forces 
personnel in the safe and effective use of the WSC aircraft. It will also help determine 
whether  a private training company is the best choice, versus establishing an in house 
government training school. This discussion of industry analysis draws entirely from 
Porter (1979). Accompanying market research was conducted using company and trade 
websites, along with the FAA resources and personnel communication with owners of 
training and aircraft sales companies.  
A short summary of the training industry as a whole depicts an industry of low 
demand and slim margins.  It is a fragmented, heavily-augmented, niche industry with 
many one-man operators who provide WSC training as a part-time job.  Most trainers 
appear to do this more out of their passion for light sport aircraft than to earn a significant 
income. (T. Sipantzi, personal communication, October, 5, 2013; K. Blevins, personal 
communication, 7, October, 2013; R. Globensky, personal communication, October, 10, 
2013)  
A. THREAT OF ENTRY OR BARRIERS TO ENTRY 
Barriers to entry for this “part time” industry are unique and plentiful, but 
certainly not impossible to overcome. The common barrier to entry is competing with a 
company that has achieved massive economies of scale, rendering the chances of 
competing on price difficult. Fortunately, for new start-ups, economies of scale in this 
industry are difficult, if not impossible, to attain. Single person, part-time, training 
1 Porter’s Five Forces of Competitive Strategy are: 1) threats to entry or barriers of entry (further 
broken down by economies of scale, product differentiation, capital requirements, cost disadvantages 
independent of size, access to distribution channels, and government policy), 2) bargaining power of 
suppliers, 3) bargaining power of customers, 4) substitute products and 5) jockeying for position among 
current competitors. 
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 companies are the norm in this industry. Following are several reasons why the industry 
has many single trainer outfits. First, the overall demand is low. WSC training industry 
has never been overly robust, but since the most recent economic downturn starting in 
2008, the number of customers has dropped significantly. The companies in this industry 
do not have large reserves of funds; so many trainers close down their operations and 
search for a different job. An industry analyst might say that opens the door for stronger 
companies with cash to snatch up customers, which this author would agree with. The 
second reason economies of scale is difficult is a regionalized customer base. Customers 
are found evenly throughout the United States. Consequently, many independent, part 
time trainers are scattered throughout the country.  
The third reason is the difficulty in finding qualified trainers to grow the business. 
The number of qualified instructors in the country is low, and safety and liability 
concerns further decrease the pool of qualified instructors. Additionally, insurance costs 
associated with safety and liability add another concern.  Each qualified trainer will affect 
the insurance premiums.  
A related concern to finding qualified instructors is the difficulty of physical 
distance between upper management located at the headquarters, and individual training 
sites. A training industry that is regulated by the Federal Aviation Association is under 
heavy scrutiny, so the distance between supervisors and compliance officials is a major 
hindrance to growth. Because the industry requires a lot of oversight and personal 
responsibility, one-man operations are the norm. With trainers mostly working for 
themselves, they eliminate the heavy administrative and management burden of trying to 
oversee operations that are often in another state. The reality of small, one-man 
operations is not just caused by the factors mentioned above. Culture of the trainers 
themselves has something to do with the single-person training companies. Many trainers 
enjoy their freedom and independence, and are often drawn to this venture because of 
their desire to work independently, and outside of the corporate life. Rooted in the 
independent culture, is an entrepreneurial spirit of innovation, trial and error, and risk 
taking.  
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 If a training facility can establish a reputation for quality training, they will be in 
an extremely advantageous position. It generally takes three to four years to establish a 
quality training reputation, and one that travels through the industry and customer base. 
This requires a fair amount of financial backing to begin.  
1. Product Differentiation 
The second major source of whether the industry has barriers to entry is product 
differentiation. Three key ways in which training companies differentiate themselves  are 
through a concentrated course schedule, experience and professional networking, and 
more importantly, a professional website. A concentrated course schedule separates the 
company from other competitors because students want to complete their training as 
quickly as possible.  Since the majority of the instructors are doing this part-time, the 
training time is often stretched out. The second factor that greatly differentiates a training 
company is their experience level. With the inherent danger of taking flight, students 
want experienced trainers. Last, a professional-looking website gets students’ attention, 
and provides a stronger first impression when they are evaluating various companies in 
their area.  
2. Capital Requirements 
The third category involves capital requirements. The cost of the standard training 
aircraft, is $60,000, explains Sipantzi (personal communication, October 5, 2013), while 
office and hanger rental space at airfields currently averages $500 a month, $6,000 for the 
first year.  He also points out developing a website, buying insurance, and gaining 
licensing will cost a new trainer $2,000; other office equipment needed will cost another 
$2,500. This brings the capital requirements needed to $70,500 for the first year. Not a 
insurmountable number when considering trainers average $80 an hour, and the average 
student needing 20-hours of training to get certified. Typically, one student per month 
(industry average) would provide a trainer with a $1,600 a month in revenue. With this 
revenue stream and initial investment amount, capital requirements would not be 
considered a huge barrier to entry. (T. Sipantzi, personal communication, October, 5, 
2013)  
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 3. Cost Disadvantages Independent of Size 
Addressing the category of cost disadvantages independent of size, location is key 
for two main reasons. The first one is weather. A warm, dry location with low winds will 
give a company the advantage of low cancellations, due to rain and winds. The second is 
having a training location that is easy to get to, and provides comfortable 
accommodations nearby.  
4. Inability to Offer Low Costs 
Given that the cost of training tends to be relatively standard, individual 
companies find it hard to reduce costs to the point where it gives them a huge advantage 
on price. If they do reduce their price considerably below their competitors, it actually 
works against them. Many customers prefer not to work with trainers that have bargain 
rates, because they see the cheap rates as affecting safety and quality of the training.  
5. Distribution Channels 
The fifth category in this section deals with access to distribution channels. 
Distribution channels would include hangers and professional, comfortable classroom 
facilities at airfields. They are considered to be at a premium at most airfields across the 
country, and tend to be a major barrier to a new operation. Established companies with 
classroom space have a considerable advantage in the market.  
6. Government Policy 
Government policy—the FAA’s regulations—is a major factor in the growth of 
the market. Many trainers agree that getting access to an FAA examiner for the final 
student check ride is the hardest part of the training schedule. With only 13 FAA 
examiners currently certified in the country, getting students qualified quickly hinges on 
this access. Additionally, the FAA is making it increasingly difficult for these examiners 
to remain current. This will result in a lower number of certified examiners over the next 
several years, adding to this already delayed phase of the training program. This will 
negatively affect demand going forward (T. Sipantzi, personal communication, October, 
5, 2013).  
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 B. BARGAINING POWER OF CUSTOMERS 
The second competitive force is bargaining power of customers (students). In this 
industry, the rates are set by the company, and are similar across the country. Since 
instructors are part-time and do the training because they enjoy the activity, prices are set 
as low as possible. The monopoly pricing gives this category a neutral mark for the 
industry because although the companies set their price, they are barely making a profit. 
Additionally, it does not bold well for competition.  
For competition to increase, demand must also increase. If more students were 
searching for flight training hours, more trainers would be expected to work on a more 
full-time basis.  Full-time operations would create economies of scale that would help 
pay down initial investments on aircraft and equipment, along with fixed costs such as 
office and hanger space at airfields.  
C. BARGAINING POWER OF SUPPLIERS 
The bargaining power of suppliers is a competitive force that is not dramatically 
relevant for the training industry. Training schools need aircraft, hanger, and office space, 
and small operational items like fuel and repair parts. In a way, the providers of these 
items would be considered suppliers. The supplier group for this case would be 
considered moderately powerful. The aircraft industry has enough manufacturers and 
product differentiation to limit their power when selling to training companies. If they 
increase their prices too much, trainers would move to the next company on their list. 
Additionally, the WSC aircraft does not have an extensive amount of unique technical 
characteristics that prevents trainers from switching to other aircraft.  
Most airfields have a fair amount of power, because their hanger space and 
facilities are difficult to come by. If they want to increase prices and eliminate WSC 
trainers and their aircraft for bigger aircraft at their airfields, WSC training companies 
would be in trouble. In this manner, the military airfield could benefit a private trainer. If 
an arrangement were to be worked out between the military and private trainers where the 
private trainer was able to operate and store his aircraft, be given a classroom for non-
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 flight training hours, and office space for daily business, the private trainer would then 
benefit from a stable environment, and a steady flow of customers.  
D. SUBSTITUTE PRODUCTS 
The substitute products category is tough to use, because there really is not a 
direct substitute for being trained on a WSC aircraft. Although there is not a direct 
substitute, there are a few possibilities for alternatives. A cheaper option would be to 
become trained on hang gliders or non-motorized aircraft gliders (i.e., Towed gliders). 
Going in a different direction with alternatives, a prospective student could become 
trained on a larger aircraft, and then downsize to a WSC. This would certainly cost more, 
but he would have more qualifications and options. This might make sense if you see 
yourself wanting to fly a bigger aircraft in the future. This would save a fair amount of 
time, because he would not be forced to re-learn the FAA material and standard aviation 
knowledge. Of course, there are nuances to the WSC that still have to be learned, but 
overall, there would be a time and cost savings. Another alternative, rather than a 
substitute for trainers, is to market the WSC aircraft experience as a vacation adventure 
activity. This could augment the student aspect of the business venture, creating another 
product line for the trainers.   
E. JOCKEYING FOR POSITION AMONG CURRENT COMPETITORS 
The final competitive force in Porter’s model is jockeying for position. In the 
past, the industry contained more of this model, with more companies offering the service 
and competing on price. As discussed earlier in this chapter, in the last five years, the 
industry has become less competitive, as the overall demand for training has decreased. 
With slowing demand, many trainers have left the business, or are doing it part-time as a 
weekend hobby. Additionally, rates have gone as low as they can go for the trainers, so 
price competition is non-existent. Regional demand has also limited what the jockeying 
companies can do to capture more business from competitors. When the economy 
recovers, it will be interesting to see how this industry changes; but for now, it looks to 
be a slow-growth industry with a non-competitive element, driven by weak demand, low 
prices, and regionalization.  
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 If the government were to contract their training, a realistic number that would be 
employed would be three. With only three civilian trainers hired as contractors, there 
would not be a recognizable change in the training industry. However, the attraction to 
train full-time and earn a wage far above the industry average, would generate interest 
from the best trainers in the country. Competition among civilian trainers would be 
intense for the opportunity to train U.S. Specials Forces (and possibly Special Forces 
from partner nations). What would temper the interest of civilian trainers would be the 
location of the training.  
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 IV. AIRCRAFT SALES INDUSTRY  
The market research discussed here was conducted using company and trade 
websites, along with FAA resources and personal communication with owners of training 
and aircraft sales companies (personal communication with Sipantzi, October, 2013; 
Blevins, October, 2013; and Globensky, October, 2013.) Discussions of and references to 
industry analysis continue to draw from Porter (1979). Approximately 95 WSC aircraft 
are sold in the U.S. each year. The manufacturer’s selling in the WSC aircraft category 
are Airborne, North Wing Design, Evolution, Air Creation USA, Concept Aviation and 
Manta Aircraft S.A. They are all U.S.-based companies except Airborne, which is located 
in Australia. Even though Airborne’s headquarters is located in Australia, they have been 
a prominent player in the U.S. for years according to Sipantzi and Blevin.  With dealers 
in several states, and annual sales estimated at $2,000,000. North Wing Design and 
Evolution are new players that are in the middle ranks for sales of the aircraft. North 
Wing Design’s annual sales hover around $1,000,000 and Evolution’s around $600,000. 
The other three are smaller outfits manufacturing and selling a combined 10% of the total 
sales (T. Sipantzi, personal communication, October, 5, 2013; K. Blevins, personal 
communication, Oct 7, 2013).  
Selling the WSC aircraft as a manufacturer’s representative or dealer is done at 
training schools by the trainers themselves. This is something that maybe a factor in full 
and open competition when it comes time to procure aircraft for training and real 
operations. The tendency will be for operators to push the procurement officials towards 
purchasing the aircraft the trainer sells because of the comfort level and familiarity. The 
average cost of the aircraft is around $40,000, which does not include customization and 
extras that are available (i.e., snow sleds, pontoon sleds, different wing configuration, 
parachute assembly). For the North Wing Navajo model, overall operating costs are 
estimated at $44 per hour (Kenny, 2012). 
For all manufacturers, aircraft are made to order and delivery time is 8–12 weeks 
across the board. None of the manufacturers carries an inventory unless a cancellation 
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 occurs on one of the aircraft already being built. Repair parts for the engine and airframe 
tend to have a delivery time of four to six weeks.  
A. THREAT OF ENTRY OR BARRIERS TO ENTRY  
1. Economies of Scale 
Much like the training industry, getting economies of scale out of a low demand, 
regionalized, and government regulated industry, is a difficult task. For these reasons, 
economies of scale is not considered a barrier to entry. Furthermore, since companies 
have a hard time reducing their costs by selling in large quantities, smaller shops can 
compete in their market and are considered a threat. That threat of entry is tempered by 
several barriers though, and will be discussed in the following paragraphs.  
2. Product Differentiation 
Under the product differentiation category, a barrier to entry for a new company is 
competing against a well-established, reputable manufacturer. It often takes decades to 
establish a reputation as a quality manufacturer; so when a new product comes along, it is 
difficult to get customers to give them an opportunity. This is unfolding currently 
between Airborne (the oldest and largest aircraft manufacturer), and Revo (a new 
company with a slightly progressive aircraft). Revo has received high marks for a sleek 
look and innovative features, but is struggling to compete with Airborne on sales. 
Customers fear an unproven aircraft and feel more comfortable with the more established 
one. Below are two comparable models from both companies.  
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Figure 4.  The Revo Trike (WSC aircraft). Made in the USA by Evolution Trikes . Rotax 
912 engine. Speed: 78 knots (90 mph). Range: 700 km 
(from Evolution.com, 2013). 
 
Figure 5.  The XT912 Tundra Arrow. Made by Airborne in Australia. Engine: Rotax 
912, 4 stroke 80HP. Speed: 65 Knots. Range: 700 KM 
(from Airborne, 2013).  
The second sub-category under product differentiation, is supportability, is 
closely tied to reputation. As mentioned in the previous paragraph, customers like the 
design of the Revo, but are unsure of the company, because it has only been making 
WSC aircraft for a few years. They fear that after buying a Revo, they would not be able 
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 to get the support they need, if the company were to shutdown or discontinue its product. 
Additionally, forming an expansive dealership network has been difficult for start-up 
companies like Evolution Trikes, maker of the Revo. The reasons for the difficulty boil to 
longevity concerns that will affect supportability. Dealers, just like customers, are wary 
of investing in an unproven company.  
3. Capital Requirements 
The next barrier to entry is capital requirements needed to start a dealership and 
grow the business.  Prior to the economic recession in 2008, Airborne Inc.-made aircraft 
were being financed; however, financing for WSC aircraft is currently unavailable.  This 
affects both established dealers and new ones. In the past, Airborne Inc. was the sole 
manufacturer to get financing based on their stability, dealer network and reputation for 
durability and reliability. Being the oldest and largest manufacturer made it seem like a 
safe bet for financing institutions. Lenders also liked the robust dealer network Airborne 
Inc. had established. This ensured support for maintenance and repair requirements. The 
final attributes that lenders appreciated were the durability and reliability that Airborne 
Inc. established with their aircraft. When the economy recovers, it will be imperative for 
competition and innovation that lenders give financing to all WSC aircraft. 
4. Cost Disadvantages Independent of Size 
Cost disadvantages, independent of size, can be another barrier to entry for many 
industries. For the aircraft sales industry, location and learning/experience curve have a 
significant impact on sales. Selling aircraft in a desirable flying location, like the 
Southwest, works well for sales. In the case of the learning/experience curve, dealers that 
sell a well-established aircraft benefit from knowing what matters to customers, and 
where cost savings can be achieved. The learning/experience curve advantage also 
combines with the common theme of reputation for safety, durability, and reliability. As 
discussed numerous times, reputation goes along way with customers and reduces the 
amount a company needs to spend on marketing.  
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 5. Access to Distribution Channels 
Access to distribution channels for selling aircraft is similar to training with 
regards to finding hanger space for display models and office space at airfields. Space at 
airfields is at premium, even in remote airfields, which is where most of the WSC aircraft 
sales and training is conducted. This situation causes a dilemma that is difficult to 
manage. To get customers you need to be near a metropolitan area, but the draw of much 
cheaper airfield space and a lower cost of living takes you hours from a major city.  
6. Government Policy 
The FAA’s increasing regulatory requirements and certifications are becoming a 
major hindrance to certifying aircraft. This issue affects all dealers equally so it would be 
considered a neutral factor in the threat verses barrier category. This does affect 
competition dramatically though. Many part-time dealers have left the industry because 
of the cost and time it takes to get aircraft certified. This is on top of falling margins due 
to the economy slowing, making it even harder to increase revenue. Five to ten years ago, 
dealers were able to get aircraft certified in 7–10 days, but now the average time is one 
month, and appears it will climb further (T. Sipantzi, personal communication, October, 
5, 2013, K. Blevins, personal communication, October, 7, 2013).  
This situation would push the author to recommend leasing already certified 
aircraft for training purposes. In time, once the military has an established program with 
experienced instructors and maintenance personnel the shift to buying aircraft might be a 
worthwhile consideration. Regarding aircraft used in real operations, they would have to 
be purchased by the government directly, because often they would be destroyed or 
severely damaged.  
B. BARGAINING POWER OF SUPPLIERS 
As stated in the beginning of this chapter, Air Creation USA, Airborne, Evolution, 
Concept Aviation, Manta Aircraft S.A., and North Wing Design compile the list of 
manufacturers for the WSC aircraft. In the context of Porter’s five forces model, they 
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 would be considered the suppliers for the aircraft sales industry. Their bargaining power 
would be considered neutral because of several competing reasons.  
First, the overall demand by the end customer has been decreased by a slow 
economy, causing prices to be depressed across the board. If consumer demand was 
higher overall, profit margins for both suppliers and dealers would be higher, allowing 
suppliers more bargaining opportunities with dealers. The second and final factor that 
affects suppliers negatively is that their product is not very unique and does not require 
much in switching costs. WSC aircraft are fairly similar, giving dealers the ability to sell 
different companies aircraft without considering switching costs (i.e., training, education, 
testing equipment). The first positive factor for the suppliers is that there are not many of 
them. Dealers do not have a ton of options to choose from so that tends to give suppliers 
the upper hand. A second factor that neutralizes dealers is the ability of the manufacturers 
to integrate forward into selling the aircraft directly to trainers and pilots, cutting dealers 
out of the picture all together.  
C. BARGAINING POWER OF CUSTOMERS 
Customers, made up of trainers and recreational pilots, do not retain much 
bargaining power due to already thin profit margins being made by dealers. Dealers are 
already just getting by and are not able to go lower, experiencing a 50% reduction in 
profit margins since 2008. In addition, since buyers are purchasing single units they do 
not have the ability to negotiate the price with bulk buys. Additionally, the customer base 
tends to be higher income individuals that care more about quality and safety, 
consequently reducing the desire to find the cheapest aircraft.  
If the government were to buy aircraft in bulk, they might be able to reduce the 
price by 10%, but any more than that would be difficult, because of where the profit 
margins already sit. Future government sales, along with maintenance plans and life cycle 
support arrangements would also put the government in a better position for negotiating 
lower prices.  
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 D. SUBSTITUTE PRODUCTS  
North Wing Design and Airborne have the most closely aligned product line in 
the industry, where they focus on portability, lightweight components, and a quiet ride. 
They also match up with price and quality. One substitute product for them that would 
still be in the WSC aircraft industry would be the Evo. The Evo is described as a cross-
country WSC aircraft because of its larger size and engine. A bigger price tag comes with 
this increased size and speed though, with the Evo model running twice that of the North 
Wing and Airborne models at $60,000. Since the North Wing and Airborne models are at 
the lower end of the WSC aircraft industry as far as cost and simplicity they do not have a 
lower end substitute. To find possible substitutes you would have to look at hang gliders, 
powered parachutes, and possibly small single person helicopters. The variety of sport 
aircraft plays a rather significant role in the prices dealers can place on WSC aircraft.  
E. JOCKEYING FOR POSITION  
The final competitive force in Porter’s model is jockeying for position. In the 
past, the industry had more of this, with more companies selling aircraft and competing 
on price. As discussed earlier in this chapter, the industry in the last five years has 
become less competitive as the overall demand for aircraft has slowed. With slowing 
demand, many dealers have left the business or are doing it part-time as a weekend hobby 
business. Additionally, profit margins have decreased by 50% on aircraft, drastically 
reducing the ability of dealers to compete with each other on price.  
According to Mr. Porter, the two characteristics of the industry that would 
normally contribute to an environment of price-cutting are that the dealers are roughly 
equal in size, and the industry is suffering from a period of slow growth. What 
counteracts these forces are low-fixed costs and low-barriers to exit. Dealers simply close 
up shop and look for a different job, rather than lose money. Regional demand has also 
limited the jockeying companies can do to capture more business from competitors. 
Customers in the industry want to test fly the aircraft in their home environment and 
consequently want to work with a local dealer.  
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 If the U. S. Government were to establish a requirement for 30 WSC aircraft a 
year for training and operations, the level and intensity of jockeying among dealers and 
manufacturers would most likely change. Between the Buy American Act (BAA) (41 
U.S.C 10a) and the Berry Amendment (10 U.S.C. 2533a), DoD procurement officials 
would not be able to purchase from Airborne ) With Airborne out, North Wing would 
have the lead in the competition due to its product line’s specifications matching up with 
the military’s desired requirements. As discussed earlier, profit margins are very thin on 
aircraft sales, but if North Wing were to win a government contract, they might be 
willing to go even lower on margins. This would alter the dynamics in the industry and 
push North Wing into the lead.  
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 V. CURRENT MILITARY TRAINING FOR THE NAVY’S SH60 
HELICOPTER 
In this chapter, we will discuss the current training practices being conducted with 
the Navy’s SH60 helicopter. The SH60 aircraft was chosen for comparison because of its 
similarities to the WSC aircraft. Some of the most apparent ones are payload capacity, 
size, and missions. Before getting into the training program, an acknowledgement of the 
vast differences of the two aircraft should also be given. The three key differences are the 
SH60’s advanced avionics, anti-submarine warfare capabilities, and munitions carrying 
capacity. These characteristics are developmental (non-commercial) additions to 
basically a commercially-available aircraft. From conventional thinking, the training 
required for these items would have to be given by active duty (and possibly reservist) 
military trainers. Their argument would be based on needing to know current applications 
in real world scenarios and the classified nature of the systems. With that, and the length 
of the training for SH60s (two-and-half years) in mind, the following paragraphs will 
discuss how their training is structured.  
The SH60 Navy helicopter-training program begins with students being sent to 
civilian flight schools for initial flight screening (IFS). During this phase, civilian 
instructors conduct introduction flights on commercial Cessnas. This is done in the first 
two months to measure student pilots’ motivation and skill level, before moving on to the 
next phase. During the next 8 months, students are trained on T-34Cs, which is a fixed 
wing aircraft. This phase is called primary flight training (PFT) and the instructors are 
civilians. Civilian instructors also use simulators throughout the first year. 
During the next 8 months, student pilots are trained by military instructors on a 
commercial helicopter, the Bell-206. This phase is called Advanced Flight Training 
(AFT). AFT is followed by the final phase, called Replacement Aircrew Group (RAG), 
which lasts 12 months. During this final phase, the student pilots are trained by military 
instructors on the SH 60.  
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 All Student Naval Aviators (SNA) start their training in Pensacola, Florida. From 
there, SH 60 student pilots are trained primarily on the Naval Air Station (NAS) in 
Corpus Christi, Texas. The other two widely-used training airfields are NAS Whiting 
Field, Milton, Florida, and Vance Air Force Base (AFB), Enid, Oklahoma. Some of the 
SH60 pilot training in the earlier phases are done on those bases. The location of these 
sites (South and Southeast) is based on plenty of open air space, low cost of living, and 
for the most part, predictable warm weather.  
The aviation training aircraft are purchased, not leased, by the U.S. military. 
Conventional thinking among government contracting and acquisition professionals is 
that procurement is the best route for aircraft. As we will see in the next chapter with the 
WSC aircraft, manufacturers/dealers charge heavy leasing fees, because the aircraft are 
mostly worthless after the lease ends. On the other hand, maintenance, is contracted to 
private companies, because the military does not have enough maintenance personnel to 
rotate from operational commands to the training commands.  
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 VI. BUY VERSUS LEASING OF AIRCRAFT AND THE IDEAL 
MIX OF CIVILIAN AND MILITARY TRAINING PERSONNEL 
A. BUY VERSUS LEASE  
According to Blevins, leasing is not the most economical option, and is not 
recommended. Leasing an aircraft for one year would cost $25,000 to $31,000 (personal 
communication with K. Blevins, November 15, 2013; and Globensky, October, 2013).  
The government could buy the same aircraft for $60,000. The reason for the high price on 
leasing is that when the lease runs out, manufacturers/dealers can only sell the aircraft for 
a few thousand dollars. Additionally, the time and administrative costs getting it re-
certified with the FAA would be prohibitive for manufacturers/dealers. The only 
advantage for the government is not having to deal with maintenance and disposal costs. 
With maintenance and disposal costs being relatively minimal, the advantage is a minor 
one.  
B. THE IDEAL MIX  
Chapters III and IV analyzed and described the training and aircraft sales industry 
of the civilian WSC aircraft, describing the forces that determine how competitive it is in 
nature. This chapter will draw on that analysis to generate the ideal training environment 
for the military. In doing so, costs will be generated that depict the future landscape for a 
military training school in Yuma, Arizona.  
After analyzing the two industries, this author has determined that a mix of 
civilian and military training elements should be utilized in the overall training of the 
SOAMV. The reasons for a civilian/military partnership are inadequate capacity in 
different elements by different entities. First, the military does not have any experience in 
this aircraft. Without experienced military instructors, it would be prudent for the military 
to leverage the private sector’s experience and cost structure, in establishing and running 




 would it make sense to build them, when the military has the space and the support 
facilities on the Yuma Proving Ground base, along with other bases in the Southwest 
United States.  
As discussed in Chapter V, the two main reasons for military personnel that run 
military flight programs are: 1) pilots need a break from deployments; and 2) the military 
tactics taught in the later stages of flight school are best taught by active duty personnel. 
The SOAMV training program is far shorter than helicopter schools or any other flight 
program. Taking into consideration the SOAMV being a short, and for the most part, a 
non-tactical training program, the above-mentioned reasons for employing military 
personnel do not necessarily apply. Additionally, military instructors would be U.S. 
Special Forces personnel, and would have numerous non-deployable jobs to choose from. 
This would also alleviate the pressure to use military instructors. Cost savings using 
contracted personnel would be significant for the program as well.  
The trend of contracting out training and maintenance support for military 
activities has grown considerably since 2001. Many issues have surfaced with this trend 
in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as other locations in the world and stateside. In their 
book, The Responsible Contract Manager, Steven Cohen and William Eimicke, state two 
reasons when it is never a good idea to contract out. First, if there will be a “negative 
impact on a capacity that an organization wishes to retain and develop.” Second, by 
contracting a function, it will reduce the ability to ensure accountability in an area where 
accountability is critical. Additionally, the government’s policy on Inherently 
Government Functions must be considered (Cohen & Eimicke, 2010, p. 47) .  
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 VII. OPTIMAL GOVERNMENT TRAINING SITE AND 
EXPECTED COSTS 
This chapter will describe the Independent Government Estimate (IGE) for a 
SOAMV training school located at U.S. Army Yuma Proving Ground in Yuma, Arizona. 
The first part of the chapter discusses synergies available with a SOAMV schoolhouse 
and related activities, low cost of living considerations, along with weather, terrain, and 
other optimal flying and training conditions.  
A. BACKGROUND OF YUMA PROVING GROUND 
U.S. Army Yuma Proving Ground tenant commands are Military Free Fall 
School, Special Operations Terminal Attack Controllers Course (SOTACC), Test 
Measurement and Diagnostic Equipment (TMDE) Support Laboratory, and Aerostat. 
Yuma proving ground falls under Army Test and Evaluation Command, with its primary 
mission to conduct tests on medium and long range artillery, aircraft armament and fire 
control systems, cargo and personnel airdrop systems, unmanned aerial systems, armored 
vehicles and automotive equipment, and technologies for defeating roadside bombs. The 
base owns 1,300 square miles, contains six airfields and controls 2,000 miles of restricted 
airspace. The combination of military support, expertise, and SOAMV related training 
are compelling reasons for a SOAMV schoolhouse and training center to be established 
there.  
B. OPTIMAL WEATHER, TERRAIN, AND COST OF LIVING 
The open-air cockpit and the aircrafts total lightweight nature are characteristics 
that would require, at least in training, the combination of warm weather, dry air, and low 
winds. The desert surrounding Yuma has those features. The desert terrain is also 
extremely similar to real world operational environments in the Middle East. The need to 
train on sand, dirt, and pavement would all be covered by Yuma’s terrain. Additionally, 
the topography that includes small mountains and shallow gorges are excellent for 
maneuver training that simulates operational environments of the Middle East.  
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 In addition to their ideal climate and topography, the cost of living in Yuma is the 
lowest in the country. As seen in Table 1, their per diem rates lead the list of possible 
locations for the schoolhouse. Commercial flights to the area are common and relatively 
inexpensive, and critical for getting personnel in and out of the training area without 
incurring heavy travel costs. Students would most likely combine SOAV training with 
Free Fall refresher training.  
 
Location Lodging Meals and Incidentals  
Yuma, AZ $78 $46 
Fayetteville, NC $94 $51 
Tacoma, WA $105 $61 
San Diego, CA $133 $71 
Table 1.   Comparative Per Diem Costs (from GSA per diem rates, 2013) 
C. PER DIEM COSTS FOR STUDENTS  
The training syllabus proposed has a three-week class schedule. The expected 
number of students is 30 for each three-week class. With one week of instructor 
preparation before each class start date the total number of students expected to graduate 
each year are 300. Table 2 illustrates the annual per diem costs associated with each 300 
students graduating from a schoolhouse located in Yuma.  
 
# of Students 
per Class 
Individual Per 
Diem Per Day 





Per Class (21 
days) 
Total Annual 
Per Diem Cost 
Per Class 
(10 months) 
30 $124 $3,720 $78,120 $781,200 
Table 2.   Per Diem Costs for Students  
D. COST OF INSTRUCTORS 
A contract would be set for three civilian instructors each making $35 an hour. 
This would be based off a 40-hour week for 10 months out of the year, for a total of 120 
hours multiplied by 10 months. The total pay for three civilians would come to $168,000 
a year. Military instructors would be at the rank of E-7. An E-7’s pay package for the 
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 Yuma area is $5,377 per month. With three military instructors, the total yearly cost 
would be $193,572. Combining the military and civilian yearly instructor costs would 
give you a total of $361,572.  
E. WSC SIMULATORS  
There is currently not a WSC simulator on the market. In contrast, there are 
several small to large-scale general aviation simulators being sold in the market place. 
Redbird, Elite, and Mechtronix have a wide selection of state of the art simulators. Prices 
range from a few thousand dollars for the desktop versions to $60,000 for enclosed 
cockpit models. The general consensus from WSC civilian trainers is that anything more 
than a basic personnel computer desktop version would exceed what is needed or desired. 
There are several producers of the inexpensive, personnel computer programs that 
simulate the basics of aviation. There seems to be enough basic aviation training with the 
PC simulators for WSC training.  
For the purpose of determining costs associated with simulators for the school 
house the estimate of 4 PC simulators at $2,000 would be appropriate for the first year. 
Each passing year it would make sense to budget for the replacement of one, adding a 
line item of $2,000 for annual simulator costs.  
F. OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE (O&M) COSTS 
O&M costs are based on the North Wing Scout XC model and the hourly 
operating cost of $43.80. The schoolhouse would own 13 aircraft and each would operate 
approximately 2,000 hours a year. Given these numbers, the total annual O&M expense 
would be $22,360.  
G. TRANSPORTATION VEHICLES 
Three trucks (four passenger), four vans (eight passenger) and one bus (36 
passenger) would be needed for trainers and the shuttling of students between 
classrooms, airfield, and lodging. This would be a General Services Administration 
(GSA) lease. Expected costs would be $95,000 annually. In addition to the vehicles, fuel 
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 costs would be approximately $34,000. This amount is rather large because of how 
spread out the base is and the traveling required between lodging, classrooms, and the 
airfield.  
H. OFFICE SUPPLIES, MEDICAL SUPPLIES, AND COMMUNICATION 
EQUIPMENT 
Office supplies for this size schoolhouse are expected to run around $15,000 per 
year. Medical supplies, to include water and other health and comfort supplies would cost 
$50,000 per year. Communication equipment, to include cell phone, projectors, 
computers, will cost approximately $24,000 per year. Startup costs for communication 
equipment in the first year would be $125,000. This figure takes into account buying 35 
computers for classrooms and offices, four projectors, and eight cell phones.  
I. HANGERS, CLASSROOMS, AND OFFICE SPACE 
Yuma proving ground has plenty of space and a relatively large amount of 
support facilities (housing, dining, MWR, medical, etc.) but it does not have the required 
hanger, classroom and office space needed for a SOAMV schoolhouse. These three 
facilities would have to be constructed before the opening of training. This author’s 
recommendation is to purchase mobile classrooms and offices, either conex boxes 
(shipping containers), or prefabricated structures on wheels. The hanger would be 
constructed of lightweight materials that would keep costs down, and could also be 
disassembled and used again somewhere else. The mobility and reuse ability of the 
school not only keeps costs down, but allows for movement of it to other installations if it 
makes sense to do so. With regards to the WSC aircraft, this decision goes along with the 
recommendation of U.S. Special Forces personnel of “buy it and try it.” Table 3 displays 






 Item Construction costs 
Hanger (100 x 200 ft) $158,000 
Classroom $42,000 
Office Space  $16,000 
Table 3.   Procurement  Costs of Temporary Facilities    
J. PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF TRAINERS 
This is a major expense for any schoolhouse and would be no different for the 
SOAMV program. Professional development would consist of re-
qualifications/certifications, industry conferences, and meetings with SOCOM leadership. 
Travel would be a large part of this cost but is unavoidable no matter where the 
schoolhouse would be located due to the geographical dispersion of industry, government 
regulators, and military installations. This would be an annual investment of 
approximately $150,000.  
K. FIRST YEAR AND ONGOING ANNUAL COSTS  
Table 4 provides a summary of the final estimated costs.  The first year  costs 
include start-up costs and annual costs  in that first year.  Ongoing annual costs would be 
for each subsequent year.   
 
Cost Category  First-year Costs   Ongoing Annual Costs  
Aircraft (13 x $60,000) $780,000  $0 
Aircraft O& M $22,360 $22,360 
Instructors  $361,572 $361,572 
Student Per Diem $781,200 $781,200 
Simulators $8,000 $2,000 
Vehicles and Fuel $129,000 $129,000 
Office and Medical  $65,000 $65,000 
Communication Eq.  $125,000 $24,000 
Professional Development $150,000 $150,000 
Hanger, Classroom, office $216,000 $0 
Total  $2,638,132  $1,535,132  
Table 4.   First Year and Ongoing Annual Costs  
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 VIII. CONCLUSION 
This project started with a big picture look at the requirement for a WSC aircraft 
in U.S. military and ended with a detailed estimate of costs for a training school. In 
between was an analysis of the training industry, aircraft sales industry, and a look at the 
structure of military aviation training. A summary of the major findings is found in the 
below paragraphs that conclude the project.  
A. SUMMARY OF MAJOR FINDINGS 
The U.S. military faces numerous threats and mission requirements in today’s 
world of IW. Each one calls on a different weapon system or platform to provide mission 
success. This project found there is a need for the Osprey and Predator to carry out 
certain missions, but it also found that there is a capability gap with OA that requires the 
SOAMV. In the process of analyzing the training industry, the project brought to light 
that small, one or two person-training centers are the standard across the U.S. 
Additionally, a regionalized customer base and overall low demand creates a relatively 
non-competitive industry. Another major factor affecting the industry is the Federal 
Aviation Administration’s recent inclusion of the WSC aircraft into the Light-Sport 
aircraft category. This inclusion added costs and time to training, causing demand to 
dramatically fall across the country. For the aircraft sales industry, similar dynamics were 
found. Demand for the aircraft has dropped 75% since the FAA rules tightened in 2010.  
Lastly, the project looked at current military aviation training and the future 
training structure of the SOAMV and its ideal training location and associated costs. The 
project specifically examined the Navy’s SH60 helicopter training program, which 
showed a mix of military and civilian trainers involved in the different phases, with 
civilians instructing student pilots in the first year and military pilots instructing in the 
second year. This arrangement works well for a training program like the SH60 because 
of the time it takes to master basic flight skills and then move on to advanced weapon 
systems training.  
 39 
 In the case of the SOAMV, the training required is only three weeks. The much 
shorter training program is due to the simple nature of the WSC aircraft, and the fact it 
does not have military weapon systems. Considering those two aspects of the aircraft, the 
need for military instructors is greatly diminished. The author contends that three civilian 
and three military instructors on staff is the correct mix of the two.  Both civilian and 
military instructors have unique skill sets that students would benefit from.  The numbers 
of each could fluctuate by one, but at all times there should be at least two of each. 
Additionally, Yuma Proving Ground was selected as the best location based on optimal 
training conditions, installation support services, and value to taxpayers. The first year  
costs for a schoolhouse in Yuma are estimated to be $2,638,132.00, with ongoing annual 
costs  estimated at $1,535,132.00. The author generated these cost estimates using 
comparable costs from the Military Free Fall school in Yuma, AZ. 
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